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In early 2018, one of Malaysia’s key security forces made a startling announcement. The Auxiliary Force, a branch
of the Royal Malaysia Police Cooperative, had entered into a partnership with the Chinese company Yitu Technology
to equip the Force’s officers with facial-recognition capabilities. Security officials will be able to rapidly compare
images caught by live body cameras with images from a central database. The head of the Auxiliary Force explained
that this use of artificial intelligence (AI) was a “significant step forward” in efforts to improve public security. He
also noted that his agency planned eventually to enhance the body-camera system so as to enable “real-time facial
recognition and instant alerts to the presence of persons of interest from criminal watch lists.” 1
Neighboring Singapore soon followed suit, declaring its plans to launch a pilot camera-installation project with the
end goal of embedding facial-recognition technology on every public lamppost. The project is ostensibly aimed at
facilitating “crowd analytics” and assisting with antiterror operations. Privacy advocates such as the Electronic
Frontier Foundation have warned that this technology will enable governments to target political opponents and
suppress free expression, but their protests have been to no avail. 2
Meanwhile in April 2018, the Guangzhou-based AI startup CloudWalk Technology reportedly signed a deal with
Zimbabwe’s government to provide facial-recognition technology for use by state-security services and to build a
national image database. CloudWalk is also known for supplying facial-recognition and identity-verification
technology to police forces in China’s Xinjiang Province, one of the most heavily repressed regions in the world. Its
new African partnership falls under the umbrella of the multicontinental Chinese infrastructure and investment scheme
known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 3 CloudWalk’s offerings threaten to exacerbate political repression in
Zimbabwe, where authorities recently carried out a violent postelection crackdown.
These are not isolated examples. Around the world, AI systems are showing their potential for abetting repressive
regimes and upending the relationship between citizen and state, thereby accelerating a global resurgence of
authoritarianism. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is driving the proliferation of AI technology to authoritarian
and illiberal regimes, an approach that has become a key component of Chinese geopolitical strategy.
The concept of AI has proven resistant to exact definition, and scholars have taken a variety of approaches to this
problem. One widespread assertion is that the goal of AI is to “make machines intelligent,” a concept often explained
with reference to human intelligence. Jerry Kaplan, however, has questioned the usefulness of such analogies. In
Kaplan’s view, while a formal definition may be elusive, “The essence of AI—indeed, the essence of intelligence—
is the ability to make appropriate generalizations in a timely fashion based on limited data.” 4
This article does not seek to resolve these disputes. Rather, it focuses on the practical effects of new technologies that
are coming into circulation thanks to three major developments: 1) the increased availability of big data from public
and private sources; 2) enhanced machine learning and algorithmic approaches; and 3) correspondingly advanced
computer processing. (Machine learning, which can be applied to tasks that range from winning video games to
identifying pathogens, is an iterative statistical process in which an AI system is introduced to a set of data and “tries
to derive a rule or procedure that explains the data or can predict future data.” 5) [OK?—eds.] While precisely which
of the resulting advances fall within the boundaries of AI might be disputed, their import for the world’s authoritarians
and their democratic opponents alike is growing ever clearer. In recent years, autocracies have achieved new levels of
control and manipulation by applying advanced computing systems to the vast quantities of unstructured data now
available not only online, but also from live video feeds and other instruments of monitoring and surveillance. From

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at Journal
of Democracy, published by Johns Hopkins University Press. Copyright restrictions may apply.

facial-recognition technologies that cross-check real-time images against massive databases to algorithms that crawl
social media for signs of opposition activity, these innovations are a game-changer for authoritarian efforts to shape
discourse and crush opposition.
AI is not the only category of new technology increasingly being harnessed by autocrats for political gain. Other
communications and information technologies, frequently used in tandem with AI, are having equally alarming
effects. These include mass surveillance, advanced biometrics, state-based cyber hacking, and information-distortion
techniques. This article highlights the repressive impact of AI technology for two reasons. First, AI provides a higherorder capability that integrates and enhances the functions of other technologies in startling new ways. Second,
mainstream understanding of the policy impact of AI technology remains limited; policy makers have yet to seriously
grapple with AI’s repressive implications.
Why AI is a Boon for Authoritarian Leaders
Although AI has significant potential as a tool for governments everywhere, it offers a number of particular benefits
to authoritarian and illiberal regimes. Despite the wide variety of nondemocratic regime types—ranging from singleparty dictatorships to hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes to military dictatorships to personalist autocracies—most
of these governments maintain power through a mixture of coercion (threatening and intimidating would-be rivals)
and cooptation (bribing or otherwise inducing political actors to join the ruling coalition).
A leader who opts to repress must rely on state-security forces to apply the necessary coercive measures. This brings
two attendant problems. First, such repression is labor-intensive and expensive; over time, it requires an increasing
amount of resources to sustain. Second, it creates a moral hazard: “the very resources that enable the regime’s
repressive agents to suppress its opposition also empower them to act against the regime itself.” 6 In other words, as a
regime increasingly relies on police or soldiers to do its dirty work, it also grows more vulnerable to pressure or even
insurrection from those same quarters. Leaders face a fraught decision as to whether the benefits of deploying security
forces to crush challenges from without outweigh the potential threat that these forces themselves pose from within.
This is where the advantages of AI technology become apparent. Instead of depending exclusively on security forces
to carry out policies of repression, authoritarian leaders can use AI to cultivate a digital repression capability that
comes at a lower cost—and avoids the moral hazard inherent in traditional repression. In fact, the most advanced
surveillance operations rely only secondarily on human agents: Many functions are instead automated through AI.
Moreover, in comparison to human operatives with limited reserves of time and attention, AI systems can cast a much
wider net. Because of this omnipresence, they can induce changes in behavior and create a significant “chilling effect”
even in the absence of sustained physical violence. If citizens know that AI “bots” are monitoring all communications
and that algorithms will pick up dissenting messages and report them to the authorities, the public has a powerful
motivation to conform. Such is the elegant simplicity of AI repression: It requires considerably fewer human actors
than conventional repression, entails less violence, and comes at a lower cost. Yet it may well have a more wideranging and systematic impact.
Even before the onset of digital repression, the landscape of contemporary authoritarianism was shifting in noteworthy
ways. First, the erosion of democratic institutions and norms has accelerated worldwide. The Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) 2018 report estimates that around 2.5 billion people now live in countries affected by this “global
autocratization trend.” 7 In fact, gradual democratic backsliding has become one of the most common routes to
authoritarianism.
Second, the manner in which autocrats exit power is also changing. Through the end of the Cold War, coups were the
most common way for autocrats to leave office, with such events comprising 48.6 percent of authoritarian exits. But
in the post–Cold War era, instances of change from below have overtaken coups. From 1989 to 2017, the most
common causes of departure for dictators were popular revolt and electoral defeat. Exits through coups have
plummeted, comprising only 13 percent of total exits (in fact, leadership exits due to civil war slightly exceeded exits
due to coups in this period). 8
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This indicates that the gravest threats to authoritarian survival today may be coming not from insider-led rebellions,
but from discontented publics on the streets or at the ballot box. The implication for dictators who want to stay in
power is clear: redirect resources to keep popular civic movements under control and do a better job of rigging
elections. In these areas, AI technology provides a crucial advantage. Rather than relying on security forces to repress
their citizenry—with all the resource costs and political risk that this entails—autocratic leaders are embracing digital
tactics for monitoring, surveilling, and harassing civil society movements and for distorting elections. A look at three
possible scenarios will help to clarify the relevance of AI to some of the most pressing challenges facing contemporary
authoritarians.
Scenario 1: Keeping tabs on popular discontent and controlling mass protest. In the first scenario, an incumbent
one-party regime faces rising discontent over economic stagnation and political suppression. Spontaneous protests
have taken place intermittently over the past year, worrying the political leadership. The regime wants to take assertive
steps to forestall mass political mobilization, but its limited resources mean that it cannot afford to rely on mass arrests
and imprisonment. It also fears that overt repression of this kind could trigger a popular backlash. Therefore, it has
settled on a two-part strategy: 1) identify, monitor, and selectively detain opposition leaders and potential key
followers; and 2) closely monitor crowd formations that could turn into mass rallies, keeping security forces on
standby to break up protests before they reach scale.
To carry out this strategy, the regime first needs to identify dissident leaders and key followers who are likely to
mobilize. It starts with an extensive survey of social-media services and personal communications. Since certain chat
groups rely on privacy settings or encryption to prevent government snooping, authorities may reach out to
international malware firms such as FinFisher or NSO Group, which peddle software designed to penetrate these
closed groups. Alternatively, the regime could choose a cheaper option and procure the services of an international
“hacker-for-hire” or a second-string malware vendor for this task. 9 This survey of online data helps the regime to
discern patterns, identify individuals of interest, and home in on relevant conversations. As the surveillance operation
builds profiles of political activists and maps civic and opposition networks, it feeds this information into an AI
algorithm, which then sifts through multiple datasets using pattern-recognition software to identify individuals with
tendencies toward political dissent. The algorithm also helps the regime to monitor issues that are provoking popular
dissatisfaction, and it looks out for communications indicating imminent protest. Armed with this information, the
regime carries out targeted detentions and preventive arrests to forestall mass disruptions.
If protests do start despite these efforts, AI can help the regime to contain them. One technology already made available
by the popular Chinese communications platform WeChat produces “heat maps” that show crowd density and measure
foot traffic in specific locations. 10 The regime can embed tracking technology in similar chat platforms, enabling it to
know instantaneously when crowds start to form. Alternatively, it can install facial-recognition systems in urban public
spaces (along the lines of Singapore’s lamppost proposal). AI systems with access to these cameras can monitor crowd
density, search for individuals carrying political signage, and keep tabs on the whereabouts of persons of interest.
Finally, AI enhances the state’s ability to deploy online disinformation tactics that work to sow confusion and undercut
potential protests. These can take the form of denial-of-information attacks (undercutting the ability of opponents to
organize), or of bot-driven information-distortion campaigns (producing a flurry of misleading posts to blur
opponents’ messaging and overwhelm information channels with noise).
Scenario 2: Keeping a restive province in check. In this example, an authoritarian regime grapples with potential
instability in an outlying province where an ethnic minority makes up the bulk of the population. The regime’s
legitimacy in this province is historically tenuous, and the region periodically goes through bouts of unrest. Recently,
the central government has decided to curb political turbulence through heavy-handed repression that combines
traditional tactics with new technology. This scenario closely hews to the current state of affairs in Xinjiang Province,
and the PRC’s ongoing efforts to quell dissent in the region sharply illuminate the vast repressive potential of AI used
in conjunction with older coercive tactics.
First, the Chinese government is making widespread use of conventional physical repression. Authorities have set up
a sprawling network of reeducation camps believed to house a million or more Muslim detainees, chiefly members of
the Uighur ethnic minority. This represents a sizable fraction of Xinjiang’s roughly 21 million people. These work
camps involve relentless indoctrination, including self-criticism and the repetition of phrases (“we will oppose
extremism, we will oppose separatism, we will oppose terrorism”). Detainees are held in locked rooms in wrenching
conditions and face draconian discipline. 11
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Second, PRC authorities are supplementing this severe physical coercion against a part of the population with a
broader approach that relies on advanced technology. They are implementing “grid-style social management,” which
entails dividing communities into “geometric zones so that security staff can systematically observe all activities with
the aid of new technologies.” 12 The state has established police stations every few hundred feet in targeted districts,
staffed by tens of thousands of security agents. Moreover, Chinese authorities are equipping this force with advanced
surveillance capabilities and systems that can perform big-data analytics.
In particular, the Chinese are building a predictive-policing program that aggregates and analyzes multiple streams of
data in order to identify potential threats. Human Rights Watch has reported on the creation by Xinjiang authorities
of an “Integrated Joint Operations Platform” (IJOP), which collects information from sources including closed-circuit
TV cameras (often equipped with facial-recognition software) and “wifi sniffers” that gather identifying addresses
from laptops and smartphones. IJOP gets additional information from license plates and ID cards examined at
checkpoints, as well as from health, banking, and legal records. 13 While the degree of integration between IJOP and
other PRC data-collection efforts is unknown, it is noteworthy that Chinese authorities are increasingly deploying
handheld scanning devices to break into smartphones and extract contacts, social-media communications, emails,
photos, and videos. In addition, the PRC recently created a mandatory DNA database with the goal of obtaining
samples from all Xinjiang residents aged 12 to 65. 14
Once the relevant information is fed into IJOP computers, algorithms sift through reams of data looking for patterns
that could signify threatening behavior. It is unclear what confidence thresholds Chinese authorities are using to run
these tests, but the algorithms are probably generating significant numbers of false matches due to system errors. Once
the machine flags an individual, that person may be picked up by security forces and detained for an indefinite period.
Developing this system has not been cheap. The sum budgeted by Xinjiang authorities for “security-related investment
projects” reportedly rose from just US$27 million in 2015 to more than $1 billion in the first quarter of 2017. 15 Yet
this is a low figure compared to the amount the state would have to spend to build a comparable system of surveillance
and repression without using AI technology.
Scenario 3: Using disinformation to delegitimize opponents. In the third scenario, an autocratic regime is organizing
national elections required by its constitution. It plans to engage in the usual election rigging, ballot-stuffing, and voter
suppression, but it is also seeking out new strategies that will help to fully guarantee a victory over the opposition. AI
technology can assist in several ways, particularly on the disinformation front.
First, AI can manipulate available information and push out key regime messages. For example, social-media
platforms use content-curation algorithms to drive users towards certain articles—and keep them addicted to their
social-media feeds. State authorities can exploit such algorithms to push out proregime messaging. AI can serve to
identify key social-media “influencers,” whom the authorities can then bribe or coerce into spreading disinformation.
AI technology can also facilitate the deployment via social-media platforms of automated, hyperpersonalized
disinformation campaigns—targeted at individuals in swing districts—much along the lines of Russian influence
efforts in the 2016 U.S. election. In recent years, there has been a growing trend of political actors spreading
disinformation by these and other means in order to energize supporters or disorient opponents.
Second, AI technology is increasingly able to produce realistic video and audio forgeries. One new technique whose
disinformation potential especially worries policy makers is the use of generative adversarial networks, which pits
competing AI systems against each another. 16 Essentially, the first machine generates forgeries that the second
machine tries to uncover. The feedback from the second system then helps the first system to design increasingly
realistic examples. Ultimately, this can result in sophisticated forgeries that even advanced AI systems may be unable
to detect. For authoritarian leaders, deep-fake technology offers a means of discrediting would-be challengers, who
may become the subjects of doctored videos that falsely purport to show them making inflammatory remarks or
engaging in vile acts.
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Key Policy Challenges
The proliferation of AI technology and the rise of digital repression pose serious policy challenges to liberal
democracies. A key question is whether powerful AI tools will cause these democracies themselves to become more
repressive. In particular, will the temptation to take advantage of AI’s surveillance potential ultimately corrode
democratic safeguards?
History suggests that citizens should be wary. In 1975, shocking allegations of U.S. intelligence-community
misconduct prompted the U.S. Senate to authorize the establishment of what came to be known as the Church
Committee. The CIA was reportedly running assassination attempts against foreign leaders, and other agencies had
set up expansive domestic-surveillance networks to monitor and harass civil rights activists, political protestors, and
Native American organizations. 17 In its final report, the Church Committee warned: “Too often, constitutional
principles were subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means.” 18
Despite a long tradition in the United States of protecting individual rights and placing checks on governmental
authority, the potential for state overreach remained vast.
Intentional abuse by state-security agencies is not the only civil-liberties issue accompanying the rise of AI. Implicit
bias and reinforced discrimination in algorithms are also causes for concern. AI learning used in policing or healthcare,
for example, can reinforce inequality and produce or perpetuate discriminatory practices. One notorious example of
implicit bias was a 2015 incident in which Google’s photo-indexing system described pictures of African Americans
as “gorillas.” The major culprit was the training data used to “teach” the algorithm to identify faces, which skewed
predominantly toward Caucasian faces. It likely did not help that only 2 percent of Google’s “professional” workforce
is African-American, which may have prevented the team from recognizing this issue sooner. 19 Subsequent research
has shown that human prejudice has a profound effect on the workings of AI systems. A 2017 article in Science
documented how machine-learning programs acquire biases from textual data: The tested program came to associate
family-related descriptions such as “parents” with female names, whereas it linked male names with terms such as
“professional.” 20
The criminal-justice sector has been an early adopter of AI-based predictive analysis, but studies reveal that the
programs involved frequently rely on biased data. For instance, crime statistics indicate that African Americans are
far likelier to be arrested by the police than Caucasian counterparts. But machine algorithms rarely consider that police
bias may be the reason for disproportionate African American arrests. Instead, the default algorithmic assumption is
that African Americans are more prone to commit crimes. This dubious conclusion forms the basis for the subsequent
predictions produced by these algorithms, underscoring a vital principle: AI machines are only as good as the data
with which they are trained.
In 2018, it is not difficult to imagine liberal-democratic governments exploiting AI technology in ways that infringe
on citizens’ rights. Fortunately, citizens in advanced democracies have successfully combatted government
surveillance abuses in the past, and robust checks and balances exist that can push back against state overreach. While
there is no guarantee that AI will not weaken democratic political systems, the risk there is less acute.
The danger is much greater for fragile democracies or countries with authoritarian tendencies. In backsliding regimes
such as Poland, Hungary, or the Philippines, the repressive potential of AI may lead to even steeper deterioration.
Illiberal governments that face prospective popular challenges have a natural interest in technology that could help
them to weather mass discontent. Even in political systems that are ostensibly democratic, governments have a high
incentive to arm security forces with intrusive technology, monitor the activities of political opponents and civil
society, and take preemptive action against potential challenges to their authority. States also closely track one
another’s actions. As AI proves its repressive value for the autocracies now pioneering new technologies, copycat
behavior from other governments is likely to follow.
The United States and China lead the world in AI technology, but they offer vastly different visions for its use. For
China, AI is an essential component of the broader system of control that underpins Communist Party rule. Moreover,
supplying new AI capabilities to bolster fellow authoritarians serves to further the regime’s grand strategic aims,
particularly “undermining the Western liberal order while reaching for PRC hegemony in Asia and the expansion of
Chinese influence worldwide.” 21
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Consequently, the Chinese are both aggressively working to develop new AI capabilities and vigorously peddling
their new products abroad. Under the flagship initiative Made in China 2025, the PRC is seeking to transform its
manufacturing capacity in order to dominate a core set of hi-tech industries. Experts caution that this campaign signals
an aspiration “not so much to join the ranks of hi-tech economies like Germany, the United States, South Korea, and
Japan, as much as replace them altogether.” 22 The rapid advance of the AI startup Yitu is emblematic of China’s push.
Yitu was founded by two Chinese AI experts in 2012, and in only six years it has passed several remarkable milestones.
Its “Dragonfly Eye” image platform already contains over 1.8 billion photographs, and Yitu claims that the system
requires only three seconds to identify an individual within its database. This dataset includes images from the PRC’s
national database, as well as an estimated 320 million entry and exit photos taken at the country’s borders. Yitu’s
value reached an estimated $2.4 billion in 2018, and the company now employs more than five-hundred persons spread
across Shanghai, Singapore, and Silicon Valley. Most importantly, its algorithms work: Yitu’s facial-recognition
technologies have won top awards from the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology and the U.S.
intelligence community’s Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) program.
As China develops a robust AI sector, it is using the BRI to spread this sophisticated technology to governments
worldwide. Illustrative projects range from constructing a network of “safe cities” in Pakistan (such cities feature
extensive monitoring technology built directly into the infrastructure) to providing Argentinian authorities with AI
and facial-recognition software that will enhance public surveillance. The PRC shrewdly assumes that the more it can
bring other countries’ models of governance into line with China’s own, the less those countries pose a threat to
Chinese hegemony. Furthermore, as governments become dependent on advanced Chinese technology to control their
populations, they will feel increasing pressure to align their policies with the PRC’s strategic interests. In fact, China’s
AI strategy is blunt about the technology’s perceived benefits: “It [AI] will become a new impetus for advancing
supply-side structural reforms, a new opportunity for rejuvenating the real economy, and a new engine for building
China into both a manufacturing and cyber superpower.” 23
Policy Responses
In the years ahead, AI will have a major impact on global politics. While no single unified policy response can
adequately address an issue so complex and multifaceted, there are several important implications for democratic
states.
In general, advanced democracies should more explicitly recognize how big a threat AI technology poses to open
political systems. China’s efforts to build sophisticated AI capabilities, along with its proliferation of such technology
to other authoritarian regimes, present serious long-term risks. Western policy makers should afford a much higher
priority to opposing these efforts, both externally and at home.
The misuse of AI technology is not limited to authoritarian regimes. As democratic governments acquire new
technologies that dramatically increase their monitoring and surveillance capabilities, they need to determine
acceptable limits to the use of these technologies. Democracies must look inward and take the lead in developing
domestic regulatory frameworks. Such a process will be messy; technological innovation often leapfrogs the ability
of regulators to devise reasonable standards and guidelines. Nonetheless, advanced democracies are in the best position
to consider how to regulate private companies and prevent abuses.
Domestic efforts should complement international action to create clearer frameworks for AI use. Initiatives such as
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights offer a useful template. Working out international
guidelines on AI technology will require a multi-stakeholder process that is inclusive in nature; flexible enough to
reflect new technological advances; and resistant to capture by China or other authoritarian governments. A much
more extensive normative discussion is also needed. The international community has yet to tackle scores of issues
related to algorithmic bias, implicit discrimination, and privacy.
Finally, democracies should consider ways to strengthen the capacity of civil society to withstand AI-fueled repression
and to participate in shaping guidelines for AI use. Local civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in repressive
environments will require more resources, training, and technological support. Many such groups have migrated
online, but they are failing to use widely available digital-security tools, such as encryption services. As a result, they
face significant risks of cyber hacking, intrusion, monitoring, and surveillance. For CSOs operating in democracies,
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the big challenge is to comprehensively monitor proposed regulations, spotlight violations stemming from the misuse
of AI, and assume an overall watchdog role. Investigations such as ProPublica’s uncovering of algorithmic implicit
bias in the U.S. criminal-justice system are making an appreciable difference in how governments use AI technology.
As more and more governments adopt AI platforms, there will be an increasing demand for such work. Internationally,
it is vital that civil society stakeholders have a strong voice in conversations about how to properly regulate AI.
AI technology is “dual-use”: It can be deployed for beneficial purposes as well as exploited for military and repressive
ends. But this technology cannot be neatly separated into “beneficial” and “harmful” buckets. The functions that gain
value from automation can just as easily be used by authoritarians for malicious purposes as by democratic or
commercial actors for beneficial ones. To help ensure that AI is used responsibly, enhancing the connections linking
the policy community to engineers and researchers will be key. In other words, those responsible for designing,
programming, and implementing AI systems also should share responsibility for applying and upholding human-rights
standards. Policy experts should be in regular, open dialogue with engineers and technologists so that all sides are
aware of potential misuses of AI and can develop appropriate responses at an early stage.
The world’s autocracies, with China in the lead, are increasingly demonstrating the dangers that lie at the intersection
of cutting-edge AI technology, broader innovations in the information and communications spheres, and authoritarian
projects of coercion and control. To counter not only the spread of high-tech repression abroad, but also potential
abuses within their own borders, policy makers in democratic states must think seriously about how to mitigate harm
and to shape better practices. From Pakistan to Zimbabwe, a dangerous authoritarian vision of the future of AI is
taking shape. The time has come for democratic actors to mount a serious response.
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